The "equation of exchange" relating the supply of money to the value of money transactions was stated by John Stuart Mill  who expanded on the ideas of David Hume. Henry Thornton introduced the idea of a central bank after the financial panic ofalthough, the concept of a modern central bank was not given much importance until Keynes published "A Tract on Monetary Reform" in InThornton published An Enquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Paper Credit of Great Britain in which he gave an account of his theory regarding the central bank's ability to control price level. According to his theory, the central bank could control the currency in circulation through book keeping.
This paper presents a re-formulated version of a canonical sticky-price model that has been extended to account for variations over time in the central bank's inflation tar- get.
We derive a closed-form solution for the model, and analyze its properties under various parameter values. The model is used to explore topics relating to the e ects of disinflationary monetary policies and inflation persistence.
In particular, we employ the model to illustrate and assess the critique that standard sticky-price models generate counterfactual predictions for the e ects of monetary policy.
We thank Gregory Mankiw and Olivier Blanchard for useful dis- cussions on several of the topics considered here.
The views expressed in this paper are our own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Governors, the sta of the Federal Reserve System, or the Central Bank of Ireland.
An important trend in macroeconomic research in recent years involves the increased use of optimization-based sticky-price models to analyze how monetary policy a ects the econ- omy and how optimal policy should be designed. One limitation of existing work in this area is that applications of the baseline model have typically been restricted to contexts in which the central bank maintains a xed infla- tion target, with particular attention being paid to the e ects of the type of monetary policy shock" that is usually analyzed in the empirical VAR literature namely, a temporary de- viation from a stable policy rule.
In this paper, we present a re-formulated version of the baseline sticky-price model that has been extended to account for variations over time in the central bank's inflation target. We derive a fully speci ed closed-form solution for the model in which output and inflation are related both to policy shocks as usually de ned and to expected future changes in the inflation target.
The model provides a simple but flexible framework for understanding a number of issues that have previously been dealt with using a range of di erent speci cations. In particular, the model sheds light on some important existing critiques regarding the general ability of sticky-price models to capture the e ects of disinflationary monetary policies.
One such critique that we consider stems from Laurence Ball's well-known ex- ample of a sticky-price economy in which an announcement of a gradual reduction in the rate of growth of the money supply results in a boom in output. This has commonly been seen as an important counterfactual prediction of these models in light of the large observed costs of disinflation; moreover, Ball's result appears at odds with the position of Woodford and others that these models adequately capture the e ect of a monetary tightening on output.
We use our framework to demonstrate how these apparently con- tradictory results can be reconciled by noting that they reflect the e ects of two di erent types of shocks in our model.
Speci cally, in the more general framework that we derive here, Ball's example of a gradual disinflation that is achieved through a deceleration in the money supply is equivalent to an example where the central bank's target inflation rate is 1 gradually reduced.
In our framework, a credible announcement of future reductions in the inflation target will indeed result in increased output today at least for most parameter values.
However, we also demonstrate that another aspect of Ball's result speci cally, that inflation can be reduced without output's ever declining below its baseline level relies on a highly restrictive assumption about pricing behavior namely, that rms do not discount their future pro ts.
We then use an extended version of our basic framework in order to assess the idea rst proposed by Ball that allowing for imperfectWHY THE FEDERAL RESERVE SHOULD ADOPT INFLATION TARGETING Frederic S. Mishkin Uris Hall Columbia University New York, New York Phone: , Fax: E-mail: [email protected] January Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author only and not those of Columbia University or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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In practice, inflation targeting is best described as an operational framework for policy decisions in which the central bank makes an explicit commitment to conduct policy to meet a publicly announced numerical inflation target within a particular time frame.
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime in which a central bank has an explicit target inflation rate for the medium term and announces this inflation target to the public. The assumption is that the best that monetary policy can do to support long-term growth of the economy is to maintain price pfmlures.com central bank uses interest rates, its main short-term monetary instrument.
Inflation targeting is a monetary policy regime in which a central bank has an explicit target inflation rate for the medium term and announces this inflation target to the public.